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Abstract 
South Korea has been a rising economic power for some decades. It exhibits several 
behavioral traits associated with rising powers such as issue leadership and opportunity 
seeking. Korea aims to be an issue leader in the field of development, while it seeks to secure 
the foundations for further sustained economic growth. In this paper, we investigate Korea’s 
global strategy since the 1990s aiming to translate its economic clout into global political 
influence. The focus is placed on a critical evaluation of the approach under the current Lee 
Myung Bak administration since 2008. This paper examines the domestic factors that have led 
Korea to pursue its strategies of securing influence most notably the legacy of the mercantilist 
developmental state. The paper raises cautionary concerns about the capacity of Korea to 
adopt a foreign policy that moves beyond economic self-interest and plays an active role in 
the creation of global public goods. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
South Korea (hereafter Korea) represents one of the most remarkable development success 
stories after 1945. Despite its impressive economic rise Korea remained long a marginal 
player in global politics. Until 1991 Korea was not even a member of the UN. Its rise as a 
political power is a relatively recent development starting with the accession to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996 and receiving a 
further boost by joining the G20 leaders’ summit in 2008. Korea has become one of the new 
global political actors “beyond the BRICs”1 that are the focus of this special issue. Although 
these new global economic and political players neither have the power to dominate others 
nor the ability to directly shape global rules, they are significant enough to either influence 
global politics as a regional power or by concentrating their resources in a specific field (vom 
Hau et al., this issue).      
In this paper, we investigate Korea’s global strategy since the 1990s aiming to translate its 
economic clout into global political influence. The focus will be placed on a critical 
evaluation of the approach under the current Lee Myung Bak administration since 2008.2 
Korea’s global political role is still underappreciated and understudied as most attention was 
captured by the BRIC countries, that is, Brazil, Russia, India, and China. In the pre-2008 
discussions to make global forums more inclusive and extend the G7 to a G133 as part of the 
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“Heilgendamm process” Korea was not included among the rising powers (Cooper and 
Antkeiwicz, 2008). Studies of “anchor countries” excluded Korea because of its OECD status 
(Stamm, 2004). There were some references to Korea in works on “emerging middle powers”, 
but they did not sufficiently reflect Korea’s own conception and strategy as a rising power 
(Cooper, 1997; Jordaan, 2003; Huelsz, 2009; Scott et al., 2010).  
Korea seeks to turn its economic success story into a political asset. It has been using its 
increasing economic clout to expand into global politics in order to protect and facilitate its 
economic interests abroad (“opportunity seeking” in the terms of vom Hau et al., this issue). 
These direct routes of influence are supplemented by a new strategy to become an issue leader 
in the field of development cooperation that uses Korea’s development experience as the 
source of “soft power” (Nye, 1990, 2004; vom Hau, et al., this issue). Korea’s global political 
engagement is a necessary consequence of its growing economic power. Facing intensified 
competition in global markets active engagement in global politics is urgently needed to 
safeguard and advance interests in the global economy. We argue that Korea’s global strategy 
is at its heart an international extension of the national industrial and mercantilist policies that 
were the essence of Korea’s development strategy in the past.4 Transformation from an 
inward-looking developmental state to an outward-looking one is taking place to cope with 
globalization imperative. This illustrates a reinvention of the state as a “quasi-enterprise 
association” (Cerny, 1997). 
Korea’s global strategy can be explained by a combination of geopolitical, economic and 
domestic political factors. Its geographical and geopolitical position (see section 2) makes it 
impossible for Korea to become a regional power like South Africa or Indonesia (Acharya, 
2009; Jordaan, this issue; Carmody, this issue). Given the geopolitical limitations Korea’s 
global strategy is preoccupied with maximizing economic gains. Korea’s global strategy is 
predominantly bilateral as we will show in its strategy negotiating free trade agreements 
(FTA) (section 2) and increasing official development assistance (ODA) in connection with 
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“resource diplomacy” (section 3). At the global level, Korea is trying to gain influence by 
advancing its soft power as a development model for the Global South and a “reliable bridge 
between advanced and developing nations” (M. B. Lee, 2010b). A concrete outcome of this 
strategy was the Seoul Development Consensus (SDC) that was agreed upon by the G20 at 
the summit in Seoul in 2010 (section 4). Concerning the driving forces of Korea’s global 
strategy we show that it is to a large extend an international extension of the national 
industrial and mercantilist policies that were the essence of Korea’s development strategy in 
the past. However, it is also noteworthy that in case of Korea’s engagement for global 
financial safety nets there are very cautious signs of going beyond immediate self-interest, 
addressing structural vulnerabilities of emerging markets to currency crisis (section 5).  
  
2. Korea as a rising global economic power  
Korea and Asian-Pacific geopolitics    
Korea’s economic and political development since the end of the Korean War in 1953 is a 
remarkable success story. From a war-destroyed country with a per capita income of $67 in 
1953 (Lee, 2008) Korea rose to OECD membership in 1996. From being a largely agricultural 
society in the 1960s, Korea has become a manufacturing powerhouse and home of successful 
multinational companies. A Confucian “hermit kingdom” in the 19th century and a country 
depending on foreign aid until the 1970s, Korea became the world’s seventh largest exporter 
of goods and the 18th largest source of foreign direct investment (UNCTAD, 2011). Most 
importantly, Koreans toppled their brutal military dictatorship in 1987 and began a 
remarkable process of democratization that laid the foundation for Korea’s rise as a 
respectable global partner. 
Until recently, however, Korea’s global economic rise has not been matched by a 
corresponding global political role. Given the persistent Cold War-style confrontation on the 
divided peninsula, intensifying strategic rivalry among big powers in the Asian pacific region, 
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and its security dependence on the US for defense against North Korea, the South has little 
room for independent foreign policy-making. While Korea has sizable military engagement in 
various UN missions and US-led wars from Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq, it acts as a 
junior ally of American forces and not as an independent power. In fact, Korea’s sovereignty 
in the security field is still limited as the US maintains operational control over the Korean 
military during wartime. Furthermore, Korea’s foreign policy has historically centered on the 
issue of North Korea. The highest priority is always placed on reunification to complete the 
unfinished nation-state building process. Due to its geopolitical limits, Korea is an unlikely 
candidate to become an international peace broker or engage in conflict reduction through 
multilateral institutions like “old middle powers” (Jordaan, 2003: 167) such as Sweden, 
Norway, Austria or Switzerland that maintained a degree of neutrality during the cold war. 
Because of Korea’s geographic location between the two great powers China and Japan there 
is no way that it would stand out as a regional leader that could represent a region or rally 
countries in a region like South Africa or Indonesia. These limits became apparent when the 
Roh Moo Hyun administration (2003-2008) had to abandon its attempts to position Korea as a 
“balancing power” in East Asia and a motor for regional integration due to the massive 
protests from the US, China, and Japan (Choe, 2005; Zhu, 2007). Faced with these 
fundamental obstacles, Korea’s efforts to enhance its global standing have concentrated on 
gaining reputation and advancing its economic interest. With the election of Ban Ki Moon, a 
Korean national, to the UN secretary general position in 2007, Korea stepped up its global 
engagement particularly in the field of development and international economic cooperation. 
The invitation to the first G20 leaders’ summit in 2008 was the most recent indication for its 
growing global prominence.5 Korea’s membership in the G20, “the premier forum for our 
international economic cooperation” (G20, 2009), is an important step towards a more active 
global role that would have been unthinkable just 15 years ago. 
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Korea’s Globalization Strategy    
Until the 1990s, Korea followed an inward looking strategy that focused on national industrial 
policies, protectionism and export promotion (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 2004; Deyo, 1987). This 
asymmetric integration into the world market was possible in the context of Korea’s position 
as a front state in the Cold War, which secured American financial aid and gave Korean 
companies access to export markets particularly in North America (Stubbs, 2005, 1999). In 
the early 1990s, Korea began to shift its strategic priority towards a more outward-orientation 
in response to pressure from economic globalization. Korean companies were increasingly 
challenged by low-wage competitors from Southeast Asia and China. Korea also became one 
of the main targets of anti-dumping complaints in the WTO against explicit and implicit 
export subsidies (Ahn, 2003). In 1994, the first democratically elected civilian President Kim 
Young Sam set up the Globalization Promotion Committee (GPC). This marked a 
government-led drive for globalization which had two main components. Firstly, it spurred 
Korean businesses’ expansion into new markets and offshoring production to gain market 
assess and reduce production costs (Jeong, 2004; E. M. Kim, 2000; Sachwald, 2001; Dent and 
Randerson, 1996). This meant that Korea had to abandon its closed capital account regime, a 
reform long demanded by Korean big businesses. Secondly, the government announced the 
desire to join the OECD, the rich-countries club and pledged structural economic reforms to 
the inward-looking developmental state (Kang, 2000).  
This first globalization drive was unilateral and unbalanced in favor of domestic capital. The 
government liberalized the outflow of capital and inflow of short-term debt, while inflow of 
long-term credit and equity remained restricted. These ill designed reforms eventually led to 
the devastating financial crisis in 1997/98 (Chang et al., 1998; Haggard, 2000; Kalinowski 
and Cho, 2009). The crisis led to a paradigm shift. By drawing lessons from the failure of the 
pre-crisis unbalanced globalization strategy, the government took aggressive steps to attract 
foreign capital inflows. Foreign capital was viewed as a vehicle to innovation-based 
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competition as well as a lever for market-oriented reforms (Sachwald, 2004; Cho and 
Kalinowski, 2010). In addition, the focus on lifting Korea’s international competitiveness 
shifted towards strengthening multilateral and bilateral cooperation. Korea began to actively 
engage in multilateral trade and investment regimes such as the WTO-Doha round, APEC, 
and ASEAN+3 (Ahn, 2003). Furthermore, Korea has joined the international trend for 
bilateral free trade arrangements (FTA) which were expected to offer additional market access 
and “trade creation” alongside multilateral regimes.6 Since the establishment of the FTA 
Roadmap in 2003, Korea is in process of negotiating FTAs with over 50 countries (MOFAT, 
2011). So far, FTAs with Chile, Singapore, European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
ASEAN, India and the EU have entered into force. The FTAs with the US was ratified in 
2011 and will become effective in 2012. The post-crisis renewed push for globalization 
placed greater emphasis on ensuring a global and regional economic environment supportive 
of the Korean economy’s overseas expansion. Rushing into FTA negotiations, Korea has 
emerged as an outspoken advocate of trade liberalization and an “open market economy” in 
accordance with the guiding policy principles of the WTO, IMF and World Bank.   
The post-crisis political leadership embraced IMF-directed structural reforms to become a 
“master student” of this controversial institution. The Korean government under President 
Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) and President Rho Moo Hyun (2003-2008), both vehement 
proponents of a free and open market economy, pushed for market-friendly structural reforms 
which were believed to deliver another economic miracle for Korea in the era of globalization. 
The current conservative government under President Lee Myung Bak (since 2008) adopted 
the catchphrase “Global Korea.” While generally continuing the global strategy of its 
predecessors, the self-proclaimed pro-business Lee administration coordinated much closer 
with the private sector and generally took a more aggressive approach. The Presidential 
Council on National Competitiveness (PCNC) was set up in February 2008. The 
establishment of the Presidential Council on National Branding (PCNB) followed in January 
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2009 to advertise Korea as a globally recognized “brand” and convoy the “soft power” 
strategy of the PCNC. The government’s understanding of soft power is commercially biased 
arguing that Korea’s rising global image and prestige would help its products and services to 
“command a higher premium” (Euh, 2010).  
The result was that Korea’s exports massively increased since the financial crisis of 1997/98 
(see chart 1). Exports as a share of Korean GDP surged from 24% on average between 1988 
and 1997 to 35.2% between 1998 and 2009 (IMF, 2011). The mercantilist growth strategy to 
increase exports and generate trade surpluses has become a political imperative to prevent 
another financial crisis and sustain economic growth, while the recent surge in trade surpluses 
and foreign exchange reserves is interpreted as growing national economic prowess. 
 
[chart 1 about here] 
 
In addition to trade policy, the government policy related to Korea’s outward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has been another main pillar of the post-crisis globalization drive. After 
liberalization of outward FDI regulations in the late-1980s Korea’s FDI activities have 
initially evolved as individual firm’s overseas business strategy. It was not until recently that 
the government introduced comprehensive policy measures to promote Korean businesses’ 
overseas investment.7 The underlying objective was to move the trading powerhouse Korea 
towards becoming a major global investor nation. Thanks to the recent government effort to 
promote outward FDI overseas investments saw an explosive growth (see chart 1). This was 
in contrast to slowing domestic investment in the post-crisis period. Consequently, concerns 
of a possible industrial hollowing-out have emerged. Yet the government firmly defends the 
globalization strategy referring to the relatively low level of Korea’s overseas investment. 
Even though Korea’s total outward FDI stocks as of GDP surged from 7.1% in 2007 to 13.9% 
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in 2009, this was not only far below the 40.8% of developed countries on average but even 
lower than the 16.5% of developing countries (UNCTAD, 2010). 
In regional composition, Asia remains the primary location of Korean outward FDI 
accounting for 46%, followed by North America (23.5%) and Europe (17.5%). In sectoral 
composition, manufacturing had a dominant position accounting for 40.6%, followed by 
wholesale & retail (14.4%) and mining & quarrying (12.5%).8 FDI outflows to developing 
Asia were driven largely by cost factors. Rising domestic wages as a result of emerging 
independent labor movements in the late 1980s has facilitated outward FDI in pursuit of lower 
production costs to developing Asia regardless of technology level. In contrast, developed 
countries, which have absorbed a significant portion of Korea’s outward FDI, were of special 
importance for Korean firms securing market access in the face of rising protectionist barriers 
and seeking strategic assets such as advanced technology (J. M. Kim and Rhee, 2009). 
Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98, a new trend in FDI outflows can be observed. 
Firstly, there was a surge in investment in China boosted by China’s accession to the WTO in 
2001. In 2002, China surpassed the US to become the largest recipient of Korea’s outward 
FDI. Particularly, in the course of post-crisis restructuring and downsizing efforts of large 
business groups, Korea’s leading export champions, engaged in outsourcing labor-intensive 
assembly operation to China. Between 2002 and 2005 Korea’s direct investment in China 
totaled $8 billion accounting for 35.2% of total Korea’s outward FDI. During the same period 
China attracted 60% of Korea’s direct investment in the manufacturing sector (KEXIM, 2011).    
This reflects a rapid internationalization of supply chains as domestic production was 
substituted by cross-border dispersion of component production and assembly. Subsequently, 
Korea’s exports of parts and components to China have sharply increased. In 2003, China 
surpassed the US as the largest trading partner of Korea. Secondly, the explosive growth of 
Korea’s outward FDI since 2006 showed a shift in its regional and sectoral composition.  
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In 2005, China’s share in Korea’s overseas investment peaked, while investment in Middle 
East, Latin America and Africa showed the fastest growth. This came with a dramatic 
investment surge in the mining sector, which makes up the largest part in Korea’s outward 
FDI in 2009 (KEXIM, 2011). The recent FDI outflows in the mining sector were largely 
attributable to a wide-range of government assistance associated with emergence of “resource 
diplomacy”. As we see below, the resource diplomacy has become increasingly critical for 
shaping FDI patterns. 
 
3. “Resource diplomacy” and official development assistance   
The term “resource diplomacy” was first used by President Roh before his official visit to 
Russia and Central Asia in Sep 2004. At that time, facing rising oil prices and political 
turmoil in the Middle East, the term addressed the need for Korea to diversify energy sources 
to reduce Korea’s over-dependency on Middle East oil. As a late comer in the race to secure 
resources abroad, Korea feared to be left behind by more powerful economic risers such as 
China (Taylor, 2006; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009) and rushed into high-level diplomacy to 
establish strategic partnerships with resource-rich developing countries. The concept of 
resource diplomacy has since been continuously extended and involves a more active strategy 
that seeks equity stakes in energy exploration in Latin America, Africa, Middle East, Central 
Asia, South Asia, and Russia. Other raw materials as well as agriculture and the issue of food 
security were added to the targets of resource diplomacy. As a consequence, regions that 
previously received little attention in Korea’s foreign policies suddenly became important. By 
setting specific targets of self-sufficiency in energy and other raw materials the government 
mobilized financial supports for Korean firms to encourage investment in overseas resource 
development. Generous credit programs and investment funds provided by state agencies as 
well as various tax benefits offered targeted assistance to overseas resource development 
projects.9 State-owned energy corporations took the lead in overseas resource development, 
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often in alliance with private companies that hesitated to invest because of the perceived 
higher risks involved. The Roh government’s concerted efforts paid off as Korea’s secured oil 
and gas reserve fields increased from 5.2 billion barrels in 2002 to 15.9 billion barrels in 2007 
(Ministry of Knowledge Economy, 2008).  
Under President Lee resource diplomacy was upgraded in scale and scope. According to the 
new plan for resource development the government seeks to pull up Korea’s self-sufficiency 
in oil and gas from 4.2% in 2007 to 28% by 2016 by investing 20 trillion won ($17 billion) 
(Ministry of Knowledge Economy, 2010). In addition, food security came into consideration. 
This was due to not only soaring food and grain prices but also the failure of a Korean 
company (Daewoo) to acquire about half of Madagascar’s arable land in 2008. The deal failed 
due to public protests over the land grab that drove out the Madagascan government (Borger, 
2008; Parker, 2009). In 2009, the government established a 10-year basic plan for overseas 
agricultural development providing credits to finance 100% of Korean firms’ investment in 
overseas farmland. The government support for overseas agricultural development is not 
confined to improvements of Korea’s self-sufficiency in food production,10 but underlies an 
ambitious long-term goal for Korea to break into global grain trading which is currently 
dominated by the Western “big-five.”11 
President Lee’s approach to overseas resource development placed an emphasis on a bigger 
role for the private sector. State-owned corporations in alliance with related ministries and 
policy banks created “resource development funds” of 1 trillion won ($860 million) to 
promote private sector investment in overseas resource development (Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy, 2009). Furthermore, in 2011 the National Pension Service (NPS) extended its 
overseas resource development investment program of 20 trillion won ($17 billion) for 10 
years which was approved in 2007. In addition, it announced a plan to set up a private equity 
fund with Korean business groups to invest in overseas resource development (Nomura, 2011). 
Meanwhile, resource diplomacy going beyond an initially defensive strategy to protect the 
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country’s energy supply lines turned towards enhancing Korea’s competitive edge in 
unfolding global resource wars. Special focus was placed on Korea’s competiveness in the 
nuclear power sector. Convinced of having a comparative edge in nuclear power technology, 
the government advanced with a plan to make Korea a world leading nuclear energy 
exporter.12 Korea’s resource diplomacy is thus increasingly akin to targeted industrial policy 
that now provides direct support to globally operating domestic firms rather than protecting 
them in the domestic market as was the case in the past. This new type of industrial policy 
displays typical features of “microeconomic interventionism” (Cerny, 1997: 260). The 
proactive government support for overseas resource development is a revised version of the 
mercantilist national growth strategy adjusted to imperatives of economic globalization. This 
reflects the ongoing transformation of an inward-looking developmental state into an 
outward-looking one since the 1997/98 financial crisis.  
The analysis of Korea’s ODA policy provides further evidences for the close link between 
resource diplomacy and industrial policy. Recently, ODA has been integrated into high-level 
resource diplomacy as an effective political vehicle to smooth Korea’s overseas resource 
development projects in selected developing countries. Throughout the 1990s, Korea’s ODA 
expenditures remained low and began to rise only in 2003 along with Korea’s military 
deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan.13 Initially, Iraq alone received 40.1% of bilateral grants 
in 2005 (KOICA, 2006) and remains until today one of the top five recipient countries. In the 
past there has been little public or political support for ODA in Korea and it was not until 
recently that ODA gained political momentum. One important reason for this sudden attention 
to the ODA issue was the election of Ban Ki Moon, Korea’s Foreign Minister from 2004 to 
2006, as UN secretary general in 2007. This event kindled an unprecedented sense of self-
confidence in Korea to become a “global leader” and gave a big boost to Korea’s ODA 
policy. In 2007, the Korean government announced plans for joining the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) by 2010 and enacting a basic law on ODA. Korea 
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pledged to scale up its ODA volume from the level of 0.07% of its gross national income 
(GNI) in 2007 to 0.25% by 2015, the target year set in the UN Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) (Park, 2010). In 2007, there was also a significant shift in wording of Korea’s 
ODA policy. The MDGs, which had been only incidentally mentioned before now play an 
important role in ODA regulation.14 “Actively joining global efforts to achieve the MDGs” 
was since declared as primary ODA policy objective, while “pursuit of Korean-type 
development strategies based on Korea’s comparative advantage and development 
experiences” was upheld as a basic principle in Korea’s ODA (KOICA, 2008).  
In the past, Korea has replicated Japan’s ODA philosophy and practices, which have been 
markedly different from those of other OECD nations (Chun et al., 2010). Korea’s ODA has 
historically been bilateral and heavily tied, with an estimated 98% of its aid tied or partially 
tied in 2006 (Magnall, 2010: 42; OECD, 2011b, 2011c). The aid structure directs a significant 
portion of its ODA volume toward concessional loan programs tied to specific projects with a 
heavy focus on economic infrastructure and construction (Soyeun Kim, 2011:807-808). Even 
though the share of concessional loans has continuously declined, it still represents 36.9% of 
bilateral ODA in 2009, with grants making up only 63.1% - a proportion that is much lower 
than that of most other DAC members, which have portfolios comprised nearly entirely of 
grants. According to the reform plan for Korea’s international development cooperation 
issued in October 2010, the composition of loans and grants will remain at current levels of 
40% and 60% respectively till 2015 (CDIC, 2010). In terms of recipient countries by income 
level, loans made up 40% of Korea’s bilateral assistance allocated to the least developed 
countries (LDCs), while lower middle income countries (LMICs) received 38% (KOICA, 
2008). Asia continues to be a priority region of Korea’s ODA flows. Since 2006, however, 
Korea has expanded assistance to Africa and Middle East, reflecting the emerging resource 
diplomacy. Following closely on China’s announcement in November 2009 to double its 
concessional loan program to Africa (a total of $10 billion over the next three years), Korea 
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has recently increased bilateral assistance to the region through “Korea’s Initiative for 
Africa’s Development” and the second Korea-Africa Forum in Seoul, where Korea committed 
to double its aid to Africa by 2012. The recent emphasis on Africa in Korea’s ODA program 
was obviously intended to gain greater access to the continent’s natural resources (Chung, 
2010: 125-127; D. S. Lee, 2010: 117).  
The culmination of Korea’s commercial interests-driven ODA can be found in a new plan for 
a “Knowledge Sharing Program” (KSP) released in December 2009 (MOSF, 2009). The basic 
idea of the KSP that was originally initiated in 2004 is to export Korea’s development 
experience and expertise to developing countries. A new plan aims to make the KSP the 
flagship of Korea’s national branding initiative and include three new components. First, the 
selection of recipient countries is linked to target countries of Korea’s foreign policy 
including resource diplomacy. Second, it seeks commercialization of KSP policy consulting. 
The focus is on training and recruiting Korean experts for effective and high-quality 
consulting to create a pool of “star consultants” and “star consulting firms.” Furthermore, 
high-quality consulting is to be developed as a “fee for service” business model in the future. 
Third, KSP as a “software service” should be linked to hardware projects of concessional loan 
programs providing a package service. That means that policy consulting seeks concrete 
outcomes to be materialized in hardware projects for which government-funded loan 
programs are responsible (MOSF, 2009).  
As our discussion has illustrated, Korean policy makers regard development aid as a 
diplomatic means for enlarging Korea’s slice of the economic pie in recipient countries. When 
Korea’s bilateral ODA loans program joined the government-led overseas resource 
development, Korea’s ODA policy, after a decade of limited commitment, gained a strong 
foothold in Korean foreign policy. In the meantime, the KSP evolved from an element of 
Korean ODA to an important source of Korean soft power.   
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4. Korea’s soft power as an issue leader in the field of development 
The Korean government is fully aware of its geopolitical constraints and the limited resources 
Korea has to directly influence the behavior of its economic partners and shape the global 
“rules of the game.” Consequently, Korea is following a soft power approach to advance its 
interest by promoting the attractiveness of its culture and history. To establish Korea as an 
issue leader in the field of development was an expression of its soft power strategy. This 
choice is not surprising given Korea’s successful economic development and the resulting 
credibility in this field. When Korea was chosen to host the G20 summit in November 2010, 
President Lee successfully managed to include development issues on the G20 agenda. 
Koreans saw the G20 Seoul summit as belated international recognition of their success story, 
offering the opportunity to present Korea as a “model” for developing countries. Korea 
pushed for establishment of a development working group in the G20 co-chaired by Korea 
(Presidential Committee for the G20 Summit, 2010). The formulation of the Seoul 
Development Consensus (SDC) and the “Seoul action plan” at the G20 summit in Seoul 
November 2010 was a huge success for Korea’s issue leadership in the field of development 
(G20, 2010b, 2010a). The OECD High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness that was held in 
Busan in late 2011 was another major success for Korea as an emerging player in the field of 
development cooperation (OECD, 2011a). 
The most significant element of Korea’s issue leadership is to push for a paradigm shift in 
development cooperation from financial aid and “aid effectiveness” to the promotion of 
economic growth, “development effectiveness” and “knowledge sharing.” This trend is 
clearly reflected both in the SDC and the “Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-
operation” (OECD, 2011a). In fact, the main rationale put forward by President Lee for being 
“a reliable bridge between advanced and developing nations” (M. B. Lee, 2010b) was Korea’s 
successful development “within living memory” (M. B. Lee, 2010a).  
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The Korean “Knowledge Sharing Program” (KSP) under the leadership of the government-
controlled Korea Development Institute (KDI) became an important part of the Korean global 
development strategy (KDI, 2011; Jung, 2010). Like in other fields of ODA, most of the 25 
KSP partner countries are selected in line with the focus countries for resource diplomacy. 
Only five knowledge-sharing partners are least developed countries. The KSP follows a 
strictly technocratic approach of knowledge transfer. It offers 20 modules focused on the 
Korean experience on economic growth, small and medium-sized enterprises, IT, human 
resource development, trade liberalization, export promotion, taxation and productivity (KDI, 
2011).  
It is still too early for a comprehensive evaluation of the KSP, but some problems have 
already become obvious. To transfer certain elements of the Korean experience to another 
country without considering the specific historical and political context is generally a 
questionable endeavor. Most importantly, the technocratic approach largely ignores the fierce 
controversy within academia and Korean society over key factors of Korea’s development 
success. Interpretations range from characterizations of Korea as a case of “free market 
development” (for example in Wolf, 2004; Easterly, 2006) to the focus on central role of 
political leadership particularly during the military dictatorship under President Park Chung 
Hee (1962-79) (C. N. Kim, 2007; B. K. Kim and Vogel, 2011). The most persuasive 
interpretation of the Korean developmental success is the developmental state approach going 
back to classics such as Friedrich List (1856), Max Weber (1980), Albert O. Hirschmann 
(1958) but rediscovered for interpreting the Japanese economic rise by Chalmers Johnson 
(1982, 1995) and adapted to other East Asian countries since the 1980s (Evans et al., 1985; 
Wade, 1993, 2004; Evans, 1998; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Kalinowski, 2008). In a nutshell, 
Korean development until the 1980s was based on a mercantilist strategy with strong national 
industrial policies, protection of the domestic markets and export-promotion (Amsden, 1989; 
Wade, 2004). This strategy was designed by a developmental state that repressed labor and 
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colluded with big businesses, but also forced the big business conglomerates (the chaebol) to 
reinvest their profits in industries designated by the government and to improve their products 
to reach export quality (Evans, 1995; E. M. Kim, 1997). What made the Korean mercantilist 
strategy different from those in Latin America was a result-oriented state intervention which 
exercised the power to discipline private economic actors. One crucial element to guarantee 
the state’s disciplinary power was the government’s full control over the financial sector and 
the subordination of finance to industrial development (Woo-Cumings, 1991).  
In many ways the Korean development experience contradicts the principles of the 
“neoliberal” Washington Consensus and the neoclassic interpretation of development 
(Amsden, 1989; Wade, 2004, 1996). Korea’s soft power concept represented in KSP and 
SDC, however, shies away from directly challenging the Washington Consensus. While the 
SDC explicitly acknowledges the impossibility of a “one size fits all” development model it 
does not offer an alternative to the agenda of the Washington Consensus (Cammack, 2011). 
The SDC remains silent about alternatives to macro recommendations like economic 
liberalization, privatization, deregulation, monetary and fiscal policies that are at the center of 
the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990). Instead, the SDC supplements the 
Washington Consensus with micro recommendations like a focus on infrastructure, human 
resources, private sector involvement, and food security (G20, 2010b, 2010a). 
KSP and SDC reflect the change in Korean interests that are now clearly more in line with the 
developed world than with the developing world and its lack of willingness and capacity to 
challenge the established world order dominated by the G7. Not surprisingly, those aspects of 
the Korean development experience that inspired the KSP and found their way into the SDC 
largely correspond with Korea’s economic self-interests (Kalinowski, 2010). For example, 
highlighting the importance of public-private-partnerships, infrastructure and energy projects 
for development will help Korean companies to secure contracts abroad and expand beyond 
the saturated domestic markets as seen in the previous sections. Korea’s advocacy for trade 
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liberalization and intellectual property rights protection can hardly be reconciled with its past 
record of protectionism and “reverse engineering” (Smith, 1997; L. Kim, 2004). Other critical 
aspects of the Korean success story are omitted from the “official version” such as the wide 
range of export subsidies violating WTO rules (Ahn, 2003), extensive capital controls and 
exchange rate management.  
In sum, we can observe a cherry picking of lessons from the Korean development experience 
that are in line with Korean economic interests. Like in other countries, economic interests 
shape the view on history and determine what is excluded and included in the “official 
version” of the Korean development experience. The biased view on lessons from Korean 
development inbuilt in the KSP and the SDC reveals a fundamental change in Korea’s self-
interest as a developed country that diverges from that of developing countries.   
 
5. Domestic driving forces and limits of Korea’s global role 
Although being a rising economic power and a major winner in the reform of the global 
governance system and the emergence of the G20, Korea’s global role remains limited and 
ambiguous. This has partly to do with Korea’s geopolitical position and limited power 
resources, but there are also domestic obstacles. With the exception of North Korea related 
issues, Korea’s global strategy is dominated primarily by short-term economic interests of 
Korean businesses. This pattern can be explained by the path dependency of Korea’s 
mercantilist development strategy. Ironically, the institutional legacy of Korea’s global 
economic success has become an obstacle to a broader global political role that is recognized 
and accepted by countries around the world. 
In essence, Korea’s global strategy so far has been an international extension of past national 
industrial policies. The government understands its global role in terms of supporting and 
safeguarding Korean trade and investments abroad. Korean conglomerates that have emerged 
as global players need the government to support their global operations for staying 
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competitive in the global market. Consequently, they have an interest that “their” government 
engages with foreign governments to create a favorable business climate and potentially gain 
competitive advantages over competitors. A new version of the mercantilist growth strategy 
has emerged, shifting focus from protecting Korean businesses in the domestic market to 
supporting their competitiveness in the global market. The close alliance between government 
and business remains a major driving force of the new growth strategy. The mercantilist 
legacy can also be observed in the persistent inward-looking character of policy-making. 
Korea’s approach to problem solving is based on national self-help, while free riding on the 
international system. Until now, this self-help problem-solving strategy proved to be quite 
successful. Therefore, Korea had little interest in participating in multilateral cooperation 
pursuing global solutions.  
The crisis management since 2008 illustrates a typical example of inward-looking policy by 
resorting to self-help and free riding. Like many other major economies, Korea announced a 
fiscal stimulus package of 17 trillion won ($15 billion) in November 2008 and a 
supplementary budget of 28.9 trillion won ($25 billion) in March 2009 (Hur et al., 2010). The 
OECD calculated that the net effect was 6.1% of GDP from 2008 to 2010, the highest figure 
among its membership. Unlike other OECD countries, however, the Korea’s fiscal stimulus 
was focused on investment, tax relief and subsidies for businesses (3.3%), while much less 
went into social spending, households and consumption (2.3%) (OECD, 2010). This was in 
contrast to other OECD countries that mainly provided stimulus based on tax breaks, 
subsidies for consumption or automatic stabilizers like social spending. Unlike the US or 
German “cash for clunkers” programs from which Korean car makers hugely benefited, 
Korea’s own stimulus package was decisively supply-side oriented with a focus on national 
competiveness and export promotion. Korea also allowed the Korean currency to depreciate 
massively from 1,000 won per dollar in the first week of July 2008 to a peak of 1,546 won in 
the first week of March 2009.15 The massive fall in the Korean won forced the government to 
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guarantee $100 billion of the private sector’s foreign debt to avoid another currency crisis, but 
helped to achieve an export-oriented recovery by making Korean exports more competitive 
(MOSF, 2008). When capital inflows in 2009 and 2010 led to an appreciation of the currency, 
Korea massively increased its foreign reserves to limit the appreciation of the Korean won 
and “self-insure” (Chin, 2010) the country against future crises. The Korean government 
implemented and tightened unilateral capital controls by imposing limits on the build-up of 
foreign-exchange derivatives and taxes on foreigners’ purchases of Korean government bonds 
(Singh, 2010; The Economist, 2010).  
Similar to the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, Korea’s export-oriented recovery strategy 
proved to be very successful as the country was one of the first OECD countries to emerge 
from the crisis.16 Unfortunately, such a self-help strategy based on free riding on global 
demand is not compatible with Korea’s global political ambitions to be a bridge between the 
developed and developing world as well as a global leader in the G20.17 Unlike China and 
Germany, Korea has so far escaped criticism about “beggar your neighbor” policies precisely 
because it is not yet considered a global player of weight and power. 
The self-help strategies, however, have reached domestic limits and come at increasing costs 
for the society. For example, the costly accumulation of currency reserves proved to be 
ineffective to protect Korea against the financial turmoil in 2008/09. The undervaluation of 
the Korean currency has led to mounting inflationary pressures that the government is trying 
to mitigate by implementing price controls (Seyoon Kim, 2008; Seo and Sim, 2011). 
Consequently, Korea made a first remarkable departure from its inward-looking strategy and 
strongly lobbied for a global solution against financial crisis contagion by the strengthening of 
“global financial safety nets” (G20, 2010b; Truman, 2010). Korea’s commitment to global 
safety nets is compatible with longstanding criticism of IMF crisis lending practices. With its 
own traumatic experience with IMF rescue funds in 1997/98 Korea advocates for better 
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access to IMF finances without intrusive and often ill designed conditionality and “structural 
adjustment” (IEO/IMF, 2003; Easterly, 2001; SAPRIN, 2004).  
Improved global financial safety nets would provide emerging economies and developing 
countries with better access to IMF loans although successful economic risers like Korea will 
be the most obvious beneficiaries. While it is too early to evaluate effects of the global 
financial safety nets initiative, there are a couple of hints concerning its benefits and flaws. 
For example, the IMF introduces new lending facilities like the flexible credit line (FCL) that 
has no “ex post-conditionality” in order to reduce the stigma of borrowing from the IMF. 
However, the FCL can only be accessed by countries with “robust policy frameworks and 
very strong track records in economic performance” (IMF, 2010a). The brand new 
precautionary credit line (PCL) that was introduced in 2010 might broaden access to easier 
and faster IMF funds for countries with “sound economic policies” and in return requires 
“streamlined conditionality” (IMF, 2010b). So far, only three countries (Poland, Mexico, and 
Colombia) have received permission to draw funds from the FCL, but none has actually 
accessed these funds. The ex-ante conditionality privileges countries like Korea and other 
successful economic risers whose economic policies are considered “sound.” Many of the 
most vulnerable developing countries, however, will be excluded from the new credit lines 
and depend on IMF standby arrangements that come with more conditionality.  
Despite the criticism, the initiative for an improved global financial safety net in the G20 
process indicates that Korea is able of moving beyond purely inward looking self-help 
strategies. As a member of the G20, Korea participates in recalibrating global governance 
structures and in turn, Korea will be changed by these engagements as we have seen in the 
case of the admission to the OECD-DAC that led to a reformulation of Korea’s ODA statutes. 
Korea’s global engagement is also accompanied by an increasing internationalization of 
Korean NGOs that monitor and criticize the government’s global strategy.18 Over time the 
political and civil society discussion on Korea’s global role might balance the dominance of 
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business interests and pave the path towards a broader and deeper engagement with the global 
community. 
 
6. Conclusions 
What can we learn from the critical evaluation of Korea’s global strategy? Korea’s situation is 
specific in many ways, most importantly in its ongoing confrontation with North Korea and 
the resulting dependence on the US security umbrella. At the same time, our case study of 
Korea’s rise as a global political actor offers many insights into the international role of 
economic risers and the possible effects on the international community. The Korean case 
showed that a bigger international political role is an inevitable consequence of global 
economic expansion. Countries highly dependent on international trade and investment have 
to safeguard these economic activities through international negotiations and active 
participation in global institutions. Korea is a good illustration for this, because its 
dependence on foreign trade and the economic clout of its multinational companies are 
particularly accentuated. The state accompanying and supporting domestic firms in search for 
expanding market access abroad has become an inherent part of the revised mercantilist 
growth strategy since the late-1990s. Adopting to economic globalization the old Korean 
developmental state is gradually transforming into a competition state that attempts to ensure 
market outcomes at the global level (Cerny, 1997: 263-265).               
Unlike previous generations of “old middle powers” like Norway, Sweden, Austria or 
Switzerland, Korea and other economic risers19 are less “moral powers” and more interested 
in directly advancing their economic interests abroad due to their socioeconomic development 
levels. They put less faith in international organizations that are seen with suspicion of being 
controlled by Western developed countries. Rather they pursue self-help strategies and 
bilateral cooperation. Instead of offering alternatives to the realpolitik of big powers, they try 
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to emulate it, without directly challenging the global governance system still dominated by 
the established powers in the G7. 
Due to limited hard power resources, soft power strategy is particularly promising for smaller 
countries trying to have a global impact. Korea’s strategy of issue leadership in the field of 
development cooperation already paid off as we have seen from the SDC and the Busan 
Declaration on Effective Development Co-operation. Even though such a soft power strategy 
aims to advance economic gains, economic self-interest does not necessarily contradict 
support for the creation of global public goods. Promoting the “official version” of the Korean 
development model, for example, is problematic in many ways. However, for those 
developing countries able to look through the smoke screen of the official version, the Korean 
development experience offers many important lessons. 
The focus of economic risers like Korea on maximizing economic gains is a result of their 
precarious position in the global economy as well as socioeconomic constraints they face. Old 
middle powers were mature economies with comprehensive welfare states and strong civil 
society engaging in global public issues like international peace, democracy, human rights, 
and equitable development (Jordaan, 2003). Korea and other economic risers still have to 
struggle for their place in the global economy. Thanks to mercantilist policies Korea has 
managed to climb up the global value chain. This successful strategy is now impeding its 
ability to become a self-confident global player that fully embraces multilateralism and play 
an important role in the production of global public goods. Economic risers like Korea are 
also often young or unconsolidated democracies with weak welfare states and a weak civil 
society. Unlike mature welfare states, they need high growth rates to mitigate social tensions 
and conflicts. Given the oligopolistic domestic economic structure and the collusion between 
government and big business there remains only narrow political space for social actors as 
counterbalancing forces against the asymmetries in political and economic power distribution. 
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The case of Korea also shows that countries increasingly engaging in global politics are more 
exposed to global interaction, which induces them to change. Rising powers that are closely 
integrated into the global economy have strong interests in global economic and financial 
stability. As Korea’s unilateral self-help policies like currency management, foreign reserve 
accumulation and export-oriented growth are becoming less effective and increasingly costly, 
economic self-interest might push Korea towards a more active promotion of multilateral 
solutions. Multilateral engagement offers rising powers such as Korea a new dimension to 
safeguard their national economic interests more effectively, which might ultimately enable 
them to overcome the limits of their past development strategies. 
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Chart 1: Korean exports (left axis) and outward FDI (right axis) in billion USD 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADSTAT database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org, accessed 16 
December 2011 
 
 
                                                 
1 The BRICs are the large emerging powers Brazil, India and China as well as Russia. 
2 The global strategy of the Lee administration remains understudied so far. Given the timeliness of the issue, our 
evaluation remains preliminary. In light of Korea’s growing global role, more focused studies on different 
aspects of this important development are needed. 
3 The G7 consists of the US, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada. The extension to the 
G13 would have included China, India, Russia, Mexico, South Africa and Brazil. 
4 We use the term mercantilist in a broad sense of strategic government policies aiming at developing globally 
competitive national industries using managed trade regimes.  
5 Beyond the G13, the G20 also includes Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Indonesia, Australia, South Korea 
and the EU. Even though the G20 is more inclusive than the G7 it has been criticized for excluding the majority 
of countries (Payne, 2010) and underrepresenting certain world regions like North Africa (Cooper, 2011).  
6 Unlike China, Japan, and Southeast Asian countries that follow a largely politically motivated FTA strategy 
(Ravenhill, 2010) Korea’s strategy is clearly motivated by economic interests. Korea is more dependent on trade 
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than China and Japan and is unlike Southeast Asia home of huge export-oriented conglomerates that can benefit 
from FTAs.   
7 To reduce financial burdens of Korean firm’s overseas investment, the Export-Import Bank provides a loan 
plan that can cover up to 80% of estimated total overseas investment (90% for SMEs) Tax benefits include 
exemption on overseas tax paid and tax credit for dividends received from overseas subsidiary.  
8 Data for Korea’s FDI presented in this chapter are sourced from Korea Export and Import Bank (KEXIM) 
database (KEXIM, 2011).      
9 Funding support for long-term resource development includes bilateral ODA credit program provided by the 
Export-Import Bank and credit programs by related ministries. In case of investment failure repayment of 
principal loans are exempted. If Korean firm investing in overseas resource development is exempted from tax 
for dividend income in host country, then the same amount of tax is also exempted in Korea.  
10 Korea’s food and grain self-sufficiency rates have been steadily declining. In 2008, they reached record lows 
of 49.2% and 26.2%, respectively (Joong Ang Daily, ‘Korea’s dangerous import dependence’, March 11, 2011). 
11 In 2010, the MOF announced a plan to establish a Korean grain trading company importing 4 million won, 
accounting for 30% of the current yearly grain imports and to increase grain self-sufficient rate from 27% to 
47% by 2020 (Bloomberg, ‘South Korea to Set Up Grain-Trading Company in Chicago in 2011’ , Jan. 11.2011). 
12 Korea gained the global spotlight in 2009 when the country defeated global behemoths Areva and General 
Electric to win a nuclear power plant contract with UAE worth $20 billion. The contract made Korea the sixth 
exporter of nuclear power plants following the US, France, Canada, Russia and Japan. 
13 Korea’s ODA began in 1987 by establishing EDCF under the Export-Import Bank in charge of executing 
ODA loans. In 1991, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was set up executing grants. The total 
ODA from 1987 to 2009 amounted to $6.7 billion, of which 64%, $4.3 billion occurred during the past six years 
from 2003 to 2009 (KOICA, 2011). 
14 Prior to 2007 key objectives of Korea’s ODA policy were “advancement of national interests through an 
improved national image” and “enhancing good relationship with developing countries” (KOICA, 2006).   
15 Currency exchange rates from Yahoo Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com, retrieved 15 Dec 2011. 
16 Real GDP growth in Korea was 2.3% in 2008, 0.3% in 2009 and 6.2% in 2010. Only Australia and Poland 
grew more in 2009 and in 2010 only Turkey had a higher growth rate (OECD, 2011d). 
17 National self-help strategies are already identified as a major factor in the fragmentation of multilateralism and 
the G20 (Chin, 2010). 
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18 NGOs like ODA Watch (www.odawatch.net) are monitoring Korea’s ODA activities and civil society 
organizations have organized an alternative summit during the G20 meeting in Seoul in 2010 and the OECD 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. 
19 Interestingly, other East Asian countries with a similar development state legacy have similar reservations 
about “global solutions” (Kalinowski, 2011a, 2011b).   
